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Abstract: 
Issues and controversies connected to problems of endogeneity plague many topics of interest 
in political science, perhaps none more so than in the field of economic voting where in 
recent years a lively debate has developed over the potential endogeneity of subjective 
economic evaluations to partisan preferences. Although a great deal of attention has focussed 
on dealing with these problems at the analysis stage rather less attention has been paid to 
dealing with the problem at source – that is at the measurement stage. In this study we use a 
question order experiment to assess whether partisan priming influences subjective 
evaluations of the economy. If it does then endogeneity bias might be reduced by making 
questions easier for people to comprehend and answer and by taking steps to minimize the 
need for information shortcuts.   
1 Introduction 
Issues and controversies connected to problems of endogeneity plague many topics of interest 
in political science, perhaps none more so than in the field of economic voting where in 
recent years a lively debate has developed over the potential endogeneity of subjective 
economic evaluations to partisan preferences (see, for example Pickup and Evans 2013 and 
Lewis-Beck et al 2013). Although a great deal of attention has been paid to dealing with and 
addressing these problems at the analysis stage rather less attention has been paid to dealing 
with the problem at source – that is at the measurement stage. This is potentially a matter of 
great import. Given that the standard survey items on subjective evaluations of the economy 
are so widely used, if there are problems with the measurement of these items then many of 
the theoretical and empirical insights that have been garnered from this extensive body of 
research on economic voting may be built on somewhat shaky foundations.  
In this study we use a question order experiment to assess whether attitudes towards the 
economy are influenced by their placement in relation to government evaluations. When 
question ordering affects the meaning of response options or the weighting of factors relevant 
to answering an item, the effects can reveal the fact that choices —in ‘‘real world’’ settings 
no less than in surveys — are often inextricably bound up with the contexts within which the 
choices are made (Krosnik and Presser, 2010). If substantial question order effects are 
observed then this indicates that responses to these questions are very context specific.  So, 
for example, if responses to a question on the economy vary by whether they are preceded by 
a question on government support, this indicates that economic attitudes are inextricably tied 
to political evaluations. E.g. are endogenous to partisanship.  
Previous research on this topic has produced mixed results. A number of studies focusing 
specifically on economic voting suggests that the positioning of questions on political 
attitudes immediately prior to economic evaluation questions can influence respondents’ 
assessments of the national economy and their personal financial situation (Sears and Lau 
1983; Lau et al. 1990, Wilcox and Wlezien 1993, Palmer and Duch 2001). However, some of 
these findings have been contested (see Lewis Beck 1985). Moreover, out of those few 
survey experiments that have been carried out the results have not always been consistent and 
the samples have not always been representative of the broader population, which may in turn 
raise questions about how far the results can be generalised.  
Notable examples of this work include Palmer and Duch (2001), who carried out question 
order experiments on retrospective and prospective national and household economic 
evaluations in Hungary in relation to the placement of vote intention and strength of party 
attachment. Somewhat against their expectation they find significant order effects only on 
retrospective household evaluations, though the extent to which these results can be 
generalised to other countries in other political contexts is open to question. Wilcox and 
Wlezien (1993) carried out experiments on students samples in the US, which once again 
may have problems of external validity. The only nationally representative survey experiment 
carried out in an advanced democracy to our knowledge is Sturgis et al’s (2009) study in 
Britain, which carried out question order experiments on retrospective and prospective 
evaluations of the economy in relation to the placement of vote recall. However, although the 
question order effects were in the expected direction they did not reach conventional levels of 
significance. 
Existing research thus provides somewhat suggestive evidence that standard survey items on 
the economy can be subject to significant partisan bias. Given the inconsistency of these 
results it is therefore important to replicate.  Moreover the potential sources of this bias are 
not well understood. Broadly speaking the literature on partisanship suggests two main ways 
in which partisan differences may influence responses to economic questions.  First, 
partisanship may act as a ‘perceptual screen’ (Converse et al 1960).  Accordingly supporters 
of the incumbent political party may report economic assessments that are more favourable 
than their actual economic perceptions – and engage in a type of partisan cheerleading 
(Gerber and Huber 2009). Second, partisanship may act as an ‘information shortcut’ (Downs 
1957). For a variety of reasons, citizens have neither detailed information about government 
activities nor the necessary motivation and capacity to make use of such information even 
when it is available (Bartels 1996, Zaller 1992). Accordingly, voters may use partisanship as 
a shortcut to assess legislation about which they have little or no information (Popkin  
1991:19). The distinction between these two sources of bias is important since if partisanship 
is used as an information shortcut partisan differences may be reduced by making questions 
simpler and easy to answer. 
In order to investigate this possibility we run a series of question order experiments to 
examine the extent to which political primes affect responses to subjective assessments of the 
economy. As we set out below, if partisanship acts as an information shortcut, ‘satisficing’ 
respondents who find it difficult to answer the question on the economy will use their 
attitudes towards the government to inform their response. Under these conditions we would 
therefore expect to observe significant question order effects. Moreover, if respondents use 
partisanship as a shortcut to make judgements about general policy areas on which they lack 
a clear judgement we would expect these placement effects to be stronger on general items 
(e.g. on the national economy) and weaker on specific items where the respondent possesses 
first-hand knowledge (e.g. their own household finances). 
2 The endogeneity of economic evaluations 
Economic voting is perhaps the dominant model of vote choice, with hundreds of articles and 
books written on the topic all over the world (see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007, 2013). 
Broadly speaking there are two main streams to this research: the first is based on aggregate 
analysis of the ‘real’ economy; the second is based on survey evaluations of the ‘perceived’ 
economy. Aggregate studies have consistently found that the vote reacts to a few 
macroeconomic variables – mainly unemployment and inflation; that voters are myopic, and 
so have a short time horizon, and that voters react more to negative changes in the economy 
than to corresponding positive ones (see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2013). A growing body 
of research has investigated the micro mechanisms that are thought to underpin these 
relationships using survey data to measure perceptions of the economy (typically: “How do 
you think the general economic situation in this country has changed over the last 12 
months?”).  
Recently, a number of studies have argued that these subjective evaluations of the economy 
are strongly influenced by endogenous partisan considerations and, as such, their effects on 
government approval and vote are likely to have been overestimated (see Pickup and Evans 
2013, for a review). A wide variety of different statistical techniques have been employed to 
try and untangle these endogeneity issues. Examples of this body of work include panel 
analyses (Evans and Andersen 2006; Evans and Pickup 2010);  which find that retrospective 
macro-economic perceptions are strongly conditioned by one-year lagged opinions of the 
incumbent party; before-and-after election designs (Anderson et al. 2004; Ladner and 
Wlezien 2007) which demonstrate that economic expectations and retrospective evaluations 
are conditional on voters’ estimates of election outcomes; and nonrecursive cross-sectional 
models (Van der Eijk et al. 2007; Wlezien, Franklin, and Twiggs 1997) which find that pre-
election vote intention predicts simultaneously measured perceptions of economic 
performance. As a consequence, the role of ‘economic appraisals in providing a fulcrum of 
electoral accountability has been thrown into doubt’ (Anderson 2007).  
By contrast, an alternative body of research questions these results. Using repeated cross-
sectional survey data from the ANES 1968-2010 Lewis-Beck et al (2013) show that 
economic perceptions of the mass public are strongly influenced by actual economic 
conditions, and hardly at all by partisan bias. Indeed, in a series of tests, carried out on 
different North American and European countries, Lewis-Beck and colleagues consistently 
find little or no partisan bias in economic perceptions (See Lewis-Beck, 2006; Lewis-Beck 
and Fraile, 2010; Lewis-Beck et al 2008; Nadeau et al 2013). The reasons for these 
contradictory findings are not clear. In part they may reflect different estimation strategies, 
different data sources, or different measures of partisanship that are used by different scholars 
(Lewis-Beck et al 2013). But the end result is that it is difficult to make a clear judgement on 
the extent to which economic evaluations are shaped by partisanship, if at all. 
3 Information short-cuts and question order effects 
Although a great deal of effort has been made to examine these issues of endogeneity at the 
analysis stage, rather less attention has been devoted to assessing the problem at the 
measurement stage. According to classic theories of survey methodology there is widespread 
agreement about the cognitive processes involved in answering questions optimally 
(Tourangeau and Rasinski, 1988). Specifically, respondents are presumed to execute each of 
four steps. First, they must interpret the question and deduce its intent. Next, they must search 
their memories for relevant information, and then integrate whatever information comes to 
mind into a single judgment. Finally, they must translate the judgment into a response, by 
selecting one of the alternatives offered by the question (Krosnik and Presser 2010). Each of 
these steps can be quite complex, involving considerable cognitive work (see Tourangeau & 
Bradburn, 2010). Rather than expend the effort necessary to provide optimal answers, 
respondents may take subtle or dramatic shortcuts (Krosnik 1991). That is, respondents may 
interpret each question superficially and select what they believe will appear to be a 
reasonable answer. In doing so respondents may look to the wording of the question for a 
cue, pointing to a response that can be easily selected and easily defended if necessary 
(Krosnik and Presser 2010: 265). Krosnik terms this type of response behaviour satisficing. 
People who are motivated to satisfice, as opposed to those who optimise, may be particularly 
sensitive to order effects (Krosnik and Alwin 1987). 
Accordingly, when confronted with questions about government policy that are difficult to 
understand or to answer respondents may use their partisan disposition and attitude towards 
the government as a shortcut in order to come up with a ‘satisficing’ answer. In this respect 
the standard survey question on the national economy (How do you think the general 
economic situation in this country has changed over the last 12 months?) is actually quite a 
difficult question to answer. Indeed, even trained economists frequently provide different 
answers to this question. The cognitive processes involved in answering the question 
optimally are complex: Firstly, the intent of the question is not easy to interpret. When 
answering the question respondents have to think about how to conceptualise the general 
economic situation, and may consider, to varying degrees unemployment, inflation, GDP, 
interest rates, share prices, property prices, and so on. Secondly; they must retrieve the 
information necessary to make a judgment about how these different aspects of the economy 
have changed and integrate this information into a single judgement (which is further 
complicated if the information is inconsistent, which may be a particular problem in times of 
economic uncertainty).  Finally respondents must choose an appropriate response option. 
Rather than go through all these mental gymnastics, satisficing respondents may instead rely 
on their partisanship and attitude towards the incumbent government to arrive at what they 
believe will be a reasonable answer. If so we would expect to observe significant question 
order effects; whereby responses to the economy vary according to its placement in relation 
to the political prime. 
Although question order effects can take a variety of different forms, they tend to occur 
among closely related items (Schuman and Presser 1996). Likewise the effects are almost 
always confined to contiguous items (Smith, 1988). Previous research tends to show that 
‘‘general’’ items are more susceptible to influence from ‘‘specific’’ items than vice versa 
because more general items are more open to diverse interpretation (Krosnik and Presser 
2010). Conceptual vagueness can also invite the projection of attitudes other than economic 
understanding, such as political beliefs (Ansolabehere et al 2013). 
Given that question order effects are less likely to occur for specific items, we may anticipate 
that questions on the economy which are conceptually clear and focussed and easy to 
understand will be less susceptible to political priming. In particular, questions that are ‘hard 
to answer’, such as those that are open to diverse interpretation or place cognitive demands 
on the respondent, may be more prone to priming effects since ‘satisficing’ respondents will 
look to take shortcuts in order to answer the question.  
Research Design 
To test these propositions we use a randomized question order experiment in a large scale 
quota survey carried out in the UK in March 2014 using face to face interviews by Ipsos 
Mori. We focus on retrospective measures of the economy because these measures are widely 
used and are thought to be the most important on vote choice (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 
2013). Our experimental design consists of two separate experiments using four non-
overlapping groups of participants (i.e., respondents did not participate in more than one 
experiment). Respondents are randomly allocated to one of two experiments and then 
randomly allocated to one of two conditions. In experiment 1 we examine the endogeneity of 
general sociotropic economic evaluations, and in experiment 2 we examine the endogeneity 
of household economic evaluations. Within each experiment respondents are administered 
the same set of questions on economic perceptions (which vary across experiments) and 
government approval. In condition 1 the government approval item precedes the economic 
evaluation item; in condition 2 the order was reversed.
1
 Full question wordings are provided 
in Appendix A. 
In order to have confidence that economic evaluations are not susceptible to partisan bias it is 
important that we have a strong prime. Previous studies have tended to use relatively weak 
primes to do with party identification or vote intention which does not provide a very strong 
test of endogeneity. We considered various different primes to do with partisanship, 
government approval and government support and finally opted for a question which 
activates feelings towards the incumbent Conservative-led government. The exact wording is 
as follows: How much do you like the current Conservative-led government? Do you like 
them a lot; like them a bit; neither like or dislike them; dislike them a bit; or dislike them a 
lot? The advantage of this question is that it taps into a fairly base emotion towards the 
government and should therefore provoke a somewhat stronger reaction than a more neutral 
question on satisfaction or approval.  
Results 
                                                          
1
 In order to have confidence in the internal validity of our experiment it is important that the questions that 
precede our experiment are not politically sensitive, and so do not act as an inadvertent prime The only 
questions that came before our experiment were the standard module on demographics (excluding income and 
ethnicity which are asked at the very end of the interview) and a module on the subject of stamp collecting. 
There is thus little risk that our experiment is contaminated by the questions that come before it. 
Table 1 shows responses to the question on the national economy for each of the two 
experimental conditions. In the first condition the item on the national economy comes first; 
in the second condition it comes after the political prime. At an aggregate level there is not 
much evidence of any question order effects. The mean score on economic evaluations does 
not vary between the two groups, and none of the individual cell values differ by very much. 
Similarly with respect to household economic evaluations there is no evidence of question 
order effects either and the mean between the two groups does not significantly differ (Table 
2).  
Table 1 about here 
Table 2 about here 
Although these results are encouraging in that they suggest that there is no uniform bias, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that different types of people respond to the prime in different 
ways – which may then cancel out at the aggregate level. Indeed, we would expect the prime 
to have a positive effect on economic evaluations for those people who like the government 
and a negative effect for those people who dislike the government. To test this possibility we 
examine question order effects on evaluations of the economy by attitudes towards the 
government. Table 3 shows the results for evaluations of the national economy and Table 4 
shows the results for the household economy.  
The first thing to notice is that people who like the government a lot are much more 
favourable about the economy than people who dislike the government a lot. However, even 
conditioning on government approval we do not observe any question order effects. For 
example, among people who say they dislike the government a lot, the mean evaluation of the 
national economy barely changes from 2.11 when they are primed about the government to 
2.19 when they are not. Within each category of government approval, none of the treatment 
effects are substantively large and none reach conventional levels of significance. 
Table 3 about here 
Table 4 about here 
There is thus little evidence to support the idea that economic evaluations are contaminated 
by their proximity to political items. As a further test we run two OLS regressions separately 
predicting evaluations of the household economy and national economy (on a 1–5 scale, with 
5 as most positive), with independent variables of treatment (a dummy variable indicating the 
inclusion of the political prime relative to the absence of the prime), government approval (on 
a 1–5 scale, with 5 as most positive) and an interaction between treatment and government 
approval.
2
 If economic evaluations are contaminated by the political prime then we should 
expect that the interaction term is positive and statistically significant. However, in neither 
case do we observe significant interactions (see Table 5). 
Table 5 about here 
Of course, one possibility that we ought to consider is the presence of priming effects in the 
opposite direction, whereby feelings towards the government are conditioned by economic 
perceptions. We therefore also consider the sensitivity of political evaluations to economic 
perceptions. Table 6 presents the results of two OLS regression models separately predicting 
government approval (on a 1–5 scale, with 5 as most positive), with independent variables of 
treatment (a dummy variable indicating the inclusion of the economic prime relative to the 
absence of the prime), and evaluations of either the household economy or the national 
economy (on a 1–5 scale, with 5 as most positive) and an interaction between treatment and 
economic evaluation. If government approval is contaminated by the economic prime then 
we should expect that the interaction term is positive and statistically significant. However, in 
neither case do we observe significant interactions (Table 6). 
Table 6 about here 
As one further check we also examine whether there are any question order effects by 
partisanship. The question on party identification is asked in a separate part of the 
questionnaire and so is free from any possible contamination from the survey experiment. 
However, once again we do not find any significant treatment effects (see Appendix B). 
These results all indicate that the standard survey items on the economy are free from 
contamination from political priming.   
Conclusion 
If attitudes towards the economy are conditioned by feelings for the incumbent government 
then we would expect to observe question order effects, where responses to the item on the 
economy vary according to its’ placement in relation to the item on government approval. 
                                                          
2 As the dependent variable is a 5-point scale, we have replicated these regression analyses with ordered probit models, with 
almost identical results.  
However our results clearly show that this expectation is not realised. These findings provide 
a corrective to prior published work, which have reported question order effects. However, 
there are reasons to be sceptical about the external validity of some of these prior studies, 
based as they are on a population in a transitional democracy, a sample of students in the 
USA, and borderline significant results in the UK.   
To a certain extent then the findings presented here should be reassuring to scholars of 
economic voting. Question order effects tend to occur when respondents use one question as 
a shortcut to answer the following question. Although we cannot rule out the possibility of 
‘partisan cheer-leading’, we can be fairly confident that partisanship is not being used as an 
information shortcut to answer questions on the economy. This is important because it 
suggests that the standard survey items work reasonably well, and there is no apparent need 
to make them simpler or clearer (which can help to reduce question order effects). However, 
we should perhaps also be somewhat cautious about our findings – and a number of caveats 
are worth mentioning. Firstly, our experiment took place during a time of relatively low 
economic confidence. This may have made people less responsive to our prime. Economic 
evaluations may be subject to more partisan bias during times of relatively good economic 
performance when people are not so concerned about the economy – and so are perhaps more 
easily conditioned by political cues. Secondly, our experiment also took place during a time 
of relatively low government popularity. This may have influenced the effectiveness of our 
political prime and our experiment may therefore have been constrained by ceiling (or floor) 
effects  - whereby economic evaluations couldn’t get much worse as a consequence of 
following the item on (low) government approval. As we have shown, replication is 
important, and in order to investigate these possibilities more systematically one avenue for 
future research is to undertake further replication studies at different stages of the political 
and economic cycle.  
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Table 1  National Economy evaluations 
 No prime 
(NatEcon 1
st
) 
Political prime 
(NatEcon 2
nd
) 
1 Got a lot worse 15 18 
2 Got a little worse 23 23 
3 Stayed the same 32 30 
4 Got a little better 27 27 
5 Got a lot better 2 2 
Mean 2.77 2.73 
Mean difference t=0.578; p=0.563 
N 466 500 
 
Table 2  Household Economy evaluations 
 No prime 
HHEcon 1
st
 
Political prime 
HHEcon 2
nd
 
Got a lot worse 10 9 
Got a little worse 23 28 
Stayed the same 54 47 
Got a little better 11 13 
Got a lot better 3 4 
Mean 2.75 2.75 
Mean difference t= 0.008; p=0.994 
N 519 471 
 
  
Table 3  Mean evaluations of the National Economy by government approval 
 No prime 
NatEcon 1
st
 
Political prime 
NatEcon 2
nd
 
Difference 
Like a lot 3.55 3.91 0.37 (t=1.04) 
Like a little 3.50 3.36 -0.14 (t=-1.08) 
Neither like nor 
dislike 
2.75 2.93 0.18 (t=1.70) 
Dislike a little 2.91 2.73 -0.18 (t=-1.29) 
Dislike a lot 2.19 2.11 -0.08 (t=-0.58) 
N 471 519  
 
Table 4  Mean evaluations of the Household Economy by government approval 
 No prime 
HHEcon 1
st
 
Political prime 
HHEcon 2
nd
 
Difference 
Like a lot 3.12 3.36 0.24 (t=0.645) 
Like a little 3.01 3.17 0.15 (t=1.226) 
Neither like nor 
dislike 
2.85 2.87 0.02 (t=0.272) 
Dislike a little 2.75 2.73 -0.02 (t=-0.208) 
Dislike a lot 2.37 2.40 0.03 (t=0.245) 
N    
 
  
Table 5  Treatment effects on Economic evaluations, OLS models 
 Household economy National economy 
 B SE B SE 
Treatment -0.14 0.14 -0.21 0.165 
Gov approval 0.19*** 0.036 0.35*** 0.043 
Treatment* 
Gov approval 
0.07 0.053 0.08 0.061 
Constant 2.30 0.100 1.97 0.120 
R-square 0.07  0.14  
N 983  974  
Note: The dependent variable is economic evaluation measured on a 1-5 scale, where 1 = got 
a lot worse over the last 12 months and 5 = got a lot better over the last 12 months. Reference 
group for treatment is the economy item first.  
Table 6  Treatment effects on Government approval, OLS models 
 Government approval Government approval 
 B SE B SE 
Treatment 0.17 0.22 0.17 0.19 
HH econ 0.36*** 0.05   
Nat econ   0.43*** 0.04 
Treatment* 
econ 
-0.02 0.08 -0.03 0.07 
Constant 1.40 0.16 1.22 0.13 
R-square 0.08  0.16  
N 971  954  
Note: The dependent variable is government approval on a 1-5 scale. Reference group for 
treatment is the government item first.  
 
  
Appendix A:  
Experiment 1: National Economy  
Order Condition 1 Condition 2 
1 How much do you like the current 
Conservative-led government? Do you... 
(1 Like them a lot; 2 Like them a bit; 3 
Neither like or dislike them; 4 Dislike 
them a bit; or 5 Dislike them a lot?) 
 
How do you think the general economic 
situation in this country has changed 
over the last 12 months?  
(1 Got a lot worse; 2 Got a little worse; 
3 Stayed the same; 4 Got a little better; 5 
Got a lot better) 
 
2 How do you think the general economic 
situation in this country has changed 
over the last 12 months?  
(1 Got a lot worse; 2 Got a little worse; 
3 Stayed the same; 4 Got a little better; 
5 Got a lot better) 
 
How much do you like the current 
Conservative-led government? Do you... 
(1 Like them a lot; 2 Like them a bit; 3 
Neither like or dislike them; 4 Dislike 
them a bit; or 5 Dislike them a lot?) 
 
Experiment 2: Household economy  
Order Condition 1 Condition 2 
1 How much do you like the current 
Conservative-led government? Do you... 
(1 Like them a lot; 2 Like them a bit; 3 
Neither like or dislike them; 4 Dislike 
them a bit; or 5 Dislike them a lot?) 
How does the financial situation of your 
household now compare with what it 
was 12 months ago?  
(1 Got a lot worse; 2 Got a little worse; 
3 Stayed the same; 4 Got a little better; 5 
Got a lot better) 
 
2 How does the financial situation of your 
household now compare with what it 
was 12 months ago? 
(1 Got a lot worse; 2 Got a little worse; 
3 Stayed the same; 4 Got a little better; 
5 Got a lot better) 
 
How much do you like the current 
Conservative-led government? Do you... 
(1 Like them a lot; 2 Like them a bit; 3 
Neither like or dislike them; 4 Dislike 
them a bit; or 5 Dislike them a lot?) 
N  = 2000; 500 per condition 
  
Appendix B: 
As a robustness check we also examined whether there were any question order effects when 
we conditioned on party identification rather than government approval. However, the results 
were almost exactly the same (Tables A1 and A2).  
Table A1  Mean evaluations of the National Economy by party ID 
 NatEcon 2
nd
 NatEcon 1
st
 Difference 
Labour ID 2.56 2.65 -0.10 (t=-0.817) 
Conservative  3.38 3.42 -0.04 (t=-0.303) 
LD 3.03 3.06 -0.02 (t=-0.089) 
Other 2.44 2.42 0.01 (t=0.061) 
None 2.63 2.61 0.02 (t=0.175) 
N 519 471  
 
Table A2 Mean evaluations of the Household Economy by party ID 
 HHEcon 2
nd
 HHEcon 1
st
 Difference 
Labour ID 2.64 2.68 -0.04 (t=-0.368) 
Conservative  3.06 2.89 0.17 (t=1.397) 
LD 2.83 2.66 0.21 (t=1.032) 
Other 2.47 2.64 -0.161 (t=-0.780) 
None 2.72 2.80 -0.08 (t=-0.764) 
N    
 
 
 
 
